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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STi\.TE OF UTAH
UlHTEP AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation, and ZIONS
F.mST NATIONAL BANK, National Associatwn, a corportion,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

vs.

GARY J. WILLEY ar.d JEAN M. WILLEY,

w1 fe, HORIZON INVESTMENT CORF ORATION, a corporation; OAK HILLS
RECREATION CLUB, a corporation; WESTERN STATES INVESTMENT, INC., a corporation; WESTERN STATES TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation;
TC•WNE APTS., a partnership; INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORPORATION, a
COFPORATION;
WILLIAM
MARCUS;
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REFRIGERATION,
INC._: HOLBROOK COMPANY; UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION; IDEAL ELECTRIC COMPANY: NATIONAL SURETY
CORPORATION: OLYMPIA SALES COMPANY; UTAH CONCRETE PIPE COMPANY; FEDERAL BUILDING AND LOAN;
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL; THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA; R. W. TAYLOR
STEEL C 0 MP ANY; LUCY STACY;
CHARLESWORTH PLUMBING & HEATING CO.; and DOHRMANN COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants.
li'S

Case No.
11086

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was an action commenced by United American
Lifr Insurance Company and Zions First National
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Bank to foreclose thei:. mterest in various parcels of
real estate owned by the defendants and being located
in Ogden, Utah. This appeal is concocr.ed only with ·
that 29 acre parcel of real estate on which the Oak Hilli ·
Country Club was built, the description being set forth
in the plaintiff's Complaint as the First Cause of Action.
The appeal is based upon the defendant's amended
Counter-Claim that the amount of interest charged for
the loan was usurious, which would also affect the
amount which the plaintiff should have obtained on its
First Cause of Action. The remaining Causes of Action
were based on promissory notes of the defendant which ,
were secured by separate parcels of property. While i
the funds were obtained for the Cluli's operation, the
amounts are not in dispute here and are not a basis
for this appeal. There is aiso no question iaiseu as to
the priority of the creditors mvolved.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court found, without trial, that plaintitf
was entitled to relief as prayed and granted summary
judgment on the basis of the pleadings on file, and the
deposition of Gary J. Willey. The court further denied
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis
of the amended counter-claim and dismissed the same
with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of tpe plaintiff's
2

summary judgment, a remand for trial on the question
of usury on appellants' amended counter-claim, and
an order of the court extending appellants' redemption
rights until a six month period after a final determination of this litigation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this brief where the word defendant or defendi1Bts are used, it refers to the respective interests of
, Gary J. Willey, Jean M. Willey, Horizon Investment
Corporation and Oak Hills Recreation Club.

1

The facts as set forth on file and particularly in
the deposition of defendant Gary J. Willey were basically undisputed. The defendants developed a large
country club complex near the mouth of Ogden Canyon
across from the existing El Monte Golf Course. In
the course of construction the defendant, Gary J. Wil, ley, put approximately $160,000.00 of his own funds
into the project (supported by R. 28 p. 7, 11, 64). The
i
defendants had obtained several loans for construction
of the improvements from Zions First National Bank
ll'ith the amount of $270,000.00 having been obtained
In September, 1964 (R.28 p. 13). In December, 1964,
it was determined that additional funds were required
for the completion of the country club improvements,
so Gary J. Willey approached a Mr. Campbell, who
in turn worked with a Mr. Noble in obtaining a loan
irJm the plaintiff, United American Life Insurance
Company in the sum of $450,000.00. Campbell and
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Noble worked for various individual borrowers in ar.
ranging loans for United American, and also worked
for United American in obtaining borrowers and com.
pleting the insurance company's transactions. ~Ir.
Campbell, Mr. Noble (a former employee of the Urnted
American Life Insurance Company, (R.28 p. 11) Mr.
Borger, Secretary Treasurer of the Insurance Company, and the defendant, Gary J. Willey, met a11d
worked out the details for the loan (R.28 p. 15, 16, 17,
18.) Mr. Noble personally brought the commitment to
Zions in behalf of United American (R. 28 p. 17, 18),
based on the fund~ to United American and paid paid
Campbell $13,000.00 and Noble $9,000.00 by cashier·s
checks. (R.28, p. 21, 22).
The loan with United American was not to take
effect for one year with Zions First National llank
providing the funds in the sum of $450,000.00 for the
interim period. At the expiration of the one year period,
the agreement provided that United American would
pay the $450,000.00 to Zions. From the loan of $450,000.00 made in December, 1964, $270,000.00 was applied to the original loan (R.28 p. 20), leaving $180,000.00; $70,000.00 was retained by Zions to secure
leased equipment (said equipment being those same
items foreclosed pursuant to paragraph 3 of the plaintiffs' First Cause of Action and marked as plaintiffs'
Exhibit ''C" (R. 28 p. 2~), leaving $110,000.00;
$!),000.00 was paid .dirc::Gtly to United American Life
Insurance for the_ def~ndapt by Zions First National
Bank for making the loan (R. 28 p. 21, 49, 50), $45,-
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000.00 additional and at the same time was paid to

United, but rather than Zions paying it directly, it was
paid to defendant, Gary J. 'Villey, who in turn paid
1t to United American (R.28, p. 19, 20, 47}, leaving
~.'iti,000.00. Concurrently $22,000.00 was paid to Brokers Noble and Campbell (R.28 p. 21, 22} leaving
~34,000.00 which was available for the defendants to
disburse to creditors.
The defendants at no time had the use of the
$.14,000.00 which was paid to the plaintiff, United
American Life Insurance Co. The agreement between
defendants and plaintiff, United American Life Insurance Company was that in the event other financing
could have been obtained within one year, then the
$45,000.00 would have been returned to the defendants
(R.28 p. 45). Zions First National Bank was unaware
of the additional $45,000.00 payment imposed upon
the defendant (R.28 p. 47}. The loan was taken and
paid by United American Life Insurance Company
in December, 1965 (R. 1, p. 3, 4 and Exhibit "A") at
which time interest up-to-date in the sum of $20,857.47
was paid by the defendant to Zions on a note, secured
by a first mortgage on a separate parcel of real estate
lR.28, p. 26 reads $20,000).
The terms of the ten year trust deed note ( R. l
Exhibit "A") required quarterly payments of principal
in the sum of $11,250.00, plus interest, the first payment
bcine- due on or before March 15, 1966. No payments
were made by the defendant (R.28 p. 25, 26).
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In .March, 1966, the operation Df the Club f acilitie~ !
was leased to vVestern States Investment Company ;
(R,28, p. 32, 33). Because the Company was delinquent
in payments on the lease ( R. 28, p. 33), legal action was
taken against Western (R.28, p. 35). However, a
determination was not made by the court since as a ·
practical matter the Club was closed on approximate]\·
September 20, 1966, because utilities were unavailable
based upon non-payment of the utility bills by \Vestern.
A further reason for non-determination was that the :
State of Utah had instituted a suit earlier in the Dis- '
trict Court and had the Court's order not been complied
with by October 1, 1965, the State on the basis of non·
compliance witht he order, would have closed the club
(R.28 p. 40).
Un_ited American Life Insurance Company cQm·
menced this action on October 17, 1966, took over
physical control of the Club without opposition from
the defendant or the appointment of a receiver, and has
operated it since that time. Pursuant to the Trust Deed
Note's acceleration clau~e, the entire balance was declared due and owing. in_ the sum of $450,000.00, with
interest at 8% per annum from December 15, 1965,
amounting to the sum of $9,000.00 as of March 14,
1966 (R.l, p. 5).

G nited American continued to have Wes tern lnve1)tment, or its _successor, operate it until sometime in
the $ummer of 1967, when Orl:;md Finadaca took over
the management.
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.Mr. Fiandaca later entered into a purchase agreement to purchase the Club and acreage for in excess
nf $600,000.00 (R. 39).

ARGUMENT
Point I
The District Court erred in granting summary
Judgment to plaintiff and dismissing defendants' counter-claim as to the question of usury.
I.

1

The sections of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, which govern interest rates and usury and
which are applicable to the present factual situation are
as follows:
15-1-2 "The parties to any contract may agree
in writing for the payment of interest for the
loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
things in action, not to exceed ten per cent per
annum;

(a) That a loan or any renewal thereof except a loan made under subsection (g) may specifically provide for a service charge, which shall
not exceed four percent of the principal sum of
said loan; such service charge shall not be subject to any additional charge or interest.
15-1-4 "Any judgment rendered on a lawful
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear the
interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall
be specified in the judgment; other judgments
shall bear interest at the rate of eight per cent
per annum.
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1.5-1-7 "The. taking, receiving, reserving or
charging of a . rate. of interest greater than is
allowed by section 15-1-2, shall be deemed a.forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill
or other evidence of debt carries with it, or which
has been agreed to be paid thereon. In case the
greater rate of interest has been paid, the person
by whom it has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back three times the amount
of the interest thus paid from the receiver or
taker thereof and reasonable attorney fees, provided that such action is commenced within two
years from
the time the usurious transaction oc,,
curred .

The remedy of Summary Judgment has confronted the Utah Supreme Court on numerous occasions. Rule 56 ( c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets
the standard for the determination providing that sum·
mary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,. if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any· material fact and that the moving party is ·entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." The test then is not
whether the moving party would prevail on the merits
at trial but only whether there are any genuine issues
as
material fact for the jury's determination.

to

Section 1235 of Barron and Holtzoff points out
that it is the burden of the party moving for summary
judgment to clearly demonstrate that there is no gen·
uine issue of fact. In this regard, it is pointed out that
any doubt as to whether or not a genuine issue exists
should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the
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summary judgment. Once the moving party has shown
that if the case goes to trial there will be no competent
evidence to support a finding for his opponent, it then
becomes the burden of his opponent opposing the mo1 t1on to show that there is a genuine issue to be tried;
he is not required to show that he will prevail at the
trial on the merits.
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt with summary
1udgments in a variety of factual situations and based
upon these cases certain guidelines have been provided.
These guidelines have been rather consistent irregardless of whether or not the case has been remanded to
the District Court for trial. The primary consideration
of the court has been based on the facts of the case and
the applicable law.
The guidelines as set forth m some of the more
recent cases are as follows:
Referring to the remedy of summary judgment in
Pender v. Alix, 11 Utah 2d 58, 354 P2d I 066 ( 1960) ,
a real property action, Justice Crockett in his dissent
commented:
"It should be kept upper most in mind this is
a review of a summary judgment; that it is a
drastic remedy which deprives the party of the
opportunity to present his evidence; and which
the court therefore should be extremely reluctant
lo grant. When it does so, the record must be
reviewed in the light most favorable to the defeated party; and wherever the claim of the
parties to fact are in dispute, it must be assumed
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that his claims will be believed. This is so because .he should be turned out of court without
a trial only when, in viewing the record as above
stated, and all doubts resolved in his favor, he
nevertheless would not be entitled to prevail."
In Samms v Eccles, H Utah 2d 289, 358 P2d 344
( 1961) an action in tort, the discussion of the court in
remanding the case for trial is set out below:
-"A motion for summary judgment is in effect
-a-demurrer to the-daims of the plaintiff, saying:
Assiiming they are true, no right to recovery is
shown. It is regarded as a harsh measure which
. the courts are reluctant to sanction because it
deprives the· advers'e party Of an opportunity to
present the evidence concerning the grievance
for adjudication. For this reason, plaintiff's
contentions must be considered in the light most
to her advantage and all doubts resolved in favor
of permitting her to go to trial; and only if when
the whole matter is so viewed, she could, never·
theless, establish no right to recovery, should the
motion be granted."
Tangren v. Pengalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P 2d
179 ( 1961) was an action on a joint tenancy of two
bank accounts. The court's discussion of Summary
Judgment in remanding the case was as follows:
-

"The sustaining of summary motions without
affording the party an opportunity to present
his evidence is a stringent measure. which courts
should be reluctant to grant. It should be borne
in mind that although disclosing of a case on
.such a motion may seem an easy and expeditious
method oLdealing with litigation, it may not in
fact be so. Unless the court feels a high degree
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of assurance that such ruling is correct, it may
result in defeating that purpose and actually
protracting the litigation by requiring an appeal
and then having a trial which should have been
had in the first place. Accordingly, the privilege
of presenting evidence should be denied only
when, taking the view most favorable to the
party's claims, he could not in any event establish
a right to redress under the law; and unless it
clearly so appears, that doubt should be resolved
in favor of permitting him to go to trial."
The court in Christensen v. Financial Service
Company, 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P 2d 1010 (1963), an
action on a promissory note, wherein the court remanded the case for trial summed up its view on summary judgment as follows:
"Summary judgment can properly be granted
under Rule 56 ( c) only if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, which are offered, show without dispute that the party is entitled to prevail.
This condition is obviously not met if the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint stand in opposition to the averments to the affidavits so
that there are controverted issues of fact, the
determination of which is necessary to settle the
rights of the parties. The trial judge correctly
ruled that there were such issues of fact here."
The following comments were made by this court
in Kidnian v. White, 14 Utah 2d 142, 318 P2d 898
(1963), in a case involving an amount owing on a conditional sales contract where again this court returned
the inattcr to District Court for trial:
11

"In confronting the problem presented on this
appeal we have been obliged to remain aware
that a summary judgment, which turns a party
out of coµrt without an opportunity to present
his evidence, is a harsh measure that should be
granted only when, taking the view most favorable to a party's claims and any proof that
might properly be adduced thereunder, he could
in no event prevail."
Within the last year this court has continued to
scrutinize summary judgments and their effect upon
the rights of the defeated party. In the following cases,
which were remanded to the District Court for trial the
following statements were made:

.

"Prior decisions pointed out that summary
judgment is a drastic remedy and should be
granted with reluctance. The plaintiffs should
be granted the opportunity of producing what·
ever evidence they wish, including circumstantial
evidence." Housley v. Anaconda Company 19
Utah 2d 124, 427 P2d 390 (1967).
"It will be noted that a summary judgment
can be granted only when it is shown that there
is no genuine issue a.s to any material fact and
that the moving party also is entitled to judg·
ment as a matter of law under those facts. The
court cannot consider the weight of testimony
or the credibility of ~itnesses in considering a
motion for summary judgment." Singleton v.
Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P2d 126
(1~67).

"Rule 56, U.R.C,P" should not be used where
there arc issues of fact in dispute." Hatch v.
Sugarhouse· Fiiiance Company, 434 P2d 758
(1967).
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1

"Whether we look at the record in a light
more favorable to anybody, the test is whether
there was such an issue, and we are constrained
to, and hold that in this particular case there was
such an issue of fact for presentation to an arbiter of the facts." Russell v. Hooper Irrigation
Co. 434 P2d 294 ( 1967) .
Based upon the foregoing statements of thi~ court,
the defendant submits that there are genuine issues of
fact which should be determined at trial. These issues
are developed in more detail but include, ( 1) whether
the commissions paid to Noble . and Camp bell should
be considered as interest, ( 2) whether the interest computations should be based upon the face amount of the
note or the amount received by the borrower, (3)
whether the interest should be computed on a per annum basis, ( 4) whether there was a sale of credit, ( 5)
what effect the one year interim period had on the
loan, (6) whether a service charge was specifically designated and others. The remedy of summary judgment in the instant case has been drastic for the defendant and the benefactors who are the defendants'
credits. The court should permit a trial to provide a
full disclosure of all facts and then apply the law accordingly.
As to the first question. of whether the $54,000.00
discount added to interest as provided on the promissory note exceeded the usury provisions, it has been decided by almost all courts -that a note is to
tested for
usury with reference to the actual sum received by the
borrower and n~t face amount of note.

be
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As pointed out in the statement of facts, the
amount the defendant received was minimal in comparison to the amount obligated for, and a maximum which
the plaintiff could contend that was received by the
defendant was $396,000.00. Plaintiff has never disputed the fact that none of the $54,000,00 was applied
to principal or to interest payments as provided in the
note.
National American Life Insurance Company v.
Bayou Country Club, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 417, 403 P2d
26 ( 1965) is a case which factually is very similar to
the case at hand and discusses many of the same problems encountered in this litigation. The court in that
case specifically set forth the Utah law on this question in the following statement:
"Whether interest in excess of the allowed
rate is charged will be determined by the amount
the borrower actually receives."
That case footnotes Taylor v. Budd 217 Calif. 262,
18 P2d 333, which holds:
"A note is to be tested for usury with refer·
ence to the actual sum received by the borrower,
and not by the face amount of the note."
These statements coincide with the law in general
on the subject as set forth in 91 C.J.S. 35.
"A contract or (Jbligation for the payment of
a sum of money larger than that actually le?t
to, or due from the debtor is usurious if the dif·
f erence between the face amount of the obliga·
tion and the sum actually received or owed by

14

the debtor, when added to the interest, if any,
stipulated in the contract, exceeds the return
permitted by law on the sum actually so received
or due."
.
The plaintiff contends that the law should be
otherwise ( R.30, computations). If such a contention ·
was followed to its conclusion, then the plaintiff sup~
posedly could have collected in advance up to $282,359.84) (based on plaintiff's computations) without
riolating the usury laws.
The conclusion likewise would preclude the effectiveness of the usury laws since any lender could obtain
any amount of interest based on the face of the note
without regard to the amount the borrower actually
received.

The discount of $54,000.00, when addeq to the
' sum of interest charged on the note based over a ten
(10) year period, exceeds the amount allowed by the
Usury Statute (R. 26).

I

It should be further pointed out that the computations included a 4% service charge, however, U.C.A.
15~1-2 (a) provides "That a loan or any renewal thereof
may specifically provide for a service charge, which
charge shall not exceed four percent of the principal
sum of said loan, such service charge shall not .be sub-.
Ject to any additional charge or .interest." ·

In the transaction in question, the promissory note
ur closiug documents did not specifically provide. for a .
service charge and plaintiff cannot now say that .it can
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make l)uch charge and not be included as an interest
charge.
The nearest semblance to any service charge, although not specifically set forth, was defendants' statement that $9,000.00 was paid in his behalf from Zions
to United American as a loan fee ( R. 28, p 50). If
this was determined to be the service charge, then the
additional amount of $9,000.00 should be added to
interest on the computations.
Although the statute prohibits additional mterest
on the amounts taken as a service charge, the plaintiffs
in their computations have charged interest on this
amount, which charge is also reflected in the $516,376.95 judgment as provided in the summary judgment
granted to the plaintiff.
In this area alone, there is certainly adequate dis·
pute to disallow the summary judgment to plaintiff,
and to permit defendants to prove by expert witnesses
that the calculations as to interest exceed the maximum
allowed by the Usury Statutes.
Although the foregoing analysis has assumed that
the interest rate should be based upon the full term of
the note, there is an additional question of whether
U.C.A. 15-1-12 should apply wherein it states "not to
exceed 10 percent 'per annum.'"
The following statement of this court in the Bayou
case would indicate that the per annum basis should
be used:

16

"Plaintiff at no time expected to receive the

$14,500.00 as a discount over the period of fif-

teen years, but received the said sum in advance
as a payment from the defendant, and as a bonus
111 consideration for making the loan."

In other jurisdictions, there is a diversity of opinion as suggested in 57 ALR 660 §8. That particular
section discusses the situation on some long-term loans
bearing substantially less than the maximum interest if
computed over the period of the loan, where addition~!
interest payments are required to be paid concurrently
with the interest provided in the note.
In Virgil R. Coss Mortgage Co. v. Jordan, 167
Ark. 34, 267 S.W. 590 (1924) involved a 10 year Iiote
at 6%, but the 4% commission based on 10 years was
to be paid within 4 years .. This was all treated as interest on the loan, and inasmuch as the accelerated payment of the part of the interest designated as 4% "com~
mission" would make the rate of interest in excess of the
legal maximum of 10%, the loan was usurious.

In regard to the second question, whether the
transaction was a sale of credit, and not a loan ol
money, it is necessary to look only at the facts. The
$9,000.00 which was remitted by Zions First National
Bank to plaintiff was a discount of two percent (2%)
of the loan commitment of $450,000.00 which was ostensibly for issuing the commitment. The $45,000.00 paid
to plaintiff, United American, was to be held in the
event that the plaintiff provided the permanent financing by the purchase of such loan from Zions First National Bank. Plaintiff purchased said note in Decern·
her, 1965, some ten (10) months after the original note
was signed with Zions First National Bank, and in December, 1965, upon the purchase of said note, the $45,·
000.00 was taken by plaintiff. The question therefore
becomes whether due to the fact that Zions First Na·
tional Bank was the intermediary lender for a period
of ten ( 10) months, that plaintiff can receive $54,·
000.00, which would be greater than the law allowed
under the Usury Statutes: The courts have unani·
mously agreed that no subterfuge used by a lender to
avoid Usury Statutes will be allowed and the court will
look to the substance of every transaction as to whether
the lender received excessive interest.
The Bayou case reflects the law of Utah wherein
the Court states:
"The plaintiff took the $14,500.00 as consid·
eration for making the loan and said sum can
only be considered as additional interest beca~se
the sum was never credited to defendant as pr111·
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cipal and the sum of $65,000.00 has been claimed
by plaintiff at all times in these proceedings."
"A court will look to the substance of every
transaction as to which usury is pleaded, and if
the lender is securing a greater benefit than that
provided by law by any kind of a device, the contract will be held usurious, although it is cloaked
under the guise of a commission, bonus or other
name." 'iVallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal 585, 245 P.
964. See also Haines v. Commercial .Mortgage
Co., 200 Cal. 609, 254 P. 956 and 55 AM. Jur.,
Usury Section 14.
"In testing for a usurious exaction, a fee or
bonus beyond the legal rate of interest constitutes an additional charge for interest." Haines
v. Commercial Mortgage Co., Supra. See also
Murphy v. Wilson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 132, 314
P. 2d 507.
The plaintiffs contend here, as was done in the
Bayou case, that the $45,000.00 should be considered
as a purchase for credit, a commission, a bonus or something else, but it there, as it should be here, was determined to be interest and any other guise, name or third
party dealings do not change the characteristic of the
agreement. The Court further stated:
"Plaintiff at no time expected to receive the
$H,500.00 as a discount over a period of 15
years, but received the said sum in advance as a
payme11t from the defendant and as a bonus in
consideration of making the loan."
In further reference to the allegation of plaintiffs
that this was a sale of credit, Rossberg v. Holesapple,
12:J Utah 54,4, 260 P2d 563, is cited. Although the claim ·

19

there was that it was a sale of credit, the holding of the
court was to the contrary, indicating that the court is
very skeptical of what is termed a sale of credit when
in fact it amounts to payment of interest. This case
is footnoted in 91 C.J .S. 21, wherein it states:
"These so-called loans of credit are so hkel)
to be perverted to usurious purposes that they
are viewed with great jealousy by the courts, and
if it appears from all the circumstances of the
case, that the parties intended a usurious loan,
the court will hold the transaction unlawful.
Plaintiff seems to rely a great deal on the fact
that since they were not required to purchase the loan
for a period of one ( 1 ) year and did not take the $45,.
000.00 until they purchased the note, that the transac·
tion could not be usury. However, it is the agreement
to exact and pay usurious interest and not the perform·
ance of the agreement which renders it usurious.

As stated in the Bayou case:
"The violation of the law resulted in the mak·
ing of the agreement to exact and pay usurious
interest and not in the performance of the agree·
ment. The test to be applied in any case is
whether there was an expressed intention to
charge a rate of interest greater than is allowed
by law, and this is determined as of the date of
its inception." Citing Seebold v. Eustermann,
216 Minn. 566, 13 N.\V. 2d 739, 152 A.L.R.
585; Gaither v. Farmers and Merchants Bank,
26 U.S. 37, 7 L. Ed. 43.
The fact is that United American did make the
loan, did furnish the money required, did retain the
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prepayment and did bring this law suit upon
that transaction.

.~j~,000.00

There are no basic differences in this case now be1ore the Court and the Bayou case, as in each instance
,n Insurance Company is attempting, by divious
means, to exact more money than the law allows. Re~
move the subterfuge, agreements, intermediary lender,
and you find the exact situation exists in each case. If
this type of scheme is allowed, then there is no controlling the unscrupulous lender, as in each situation they
11ill use an intermediary to make the loan, guarantee
same, collect their excess interest and then have the
mtermediary lender assign the note back, and a void the
usury statutes.
The truth of the matter is that by a scheme and
subterfuge the plaintiff exacted more money from defendant than the law allows. The fact that defendant
had opportunity of finding another lender to purchase
the loan or to pay off the loan and recover back the
h5,000.00 is not sufficient to take the transaction out
of the Usury Statute due to the fact that plaintiff had
knowledge of defendant's financial circumstances and
due to the fact that the entire transaction must be considered as a whole to determine whether plaintiff's acts
were merely a scheme and device to evade the Usury
Statute.
In plaintiff's memorandum ( R. 30, P. 89), plaintiff quotes 91 C.J.S., Usury Section 31 (c) for the
propositior~

that since defendant had opportunity to
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pay off $450,000.00 on or before plaintiff purchased
note from Zions, that plaintiff now can take the $45,·
000.00 as a penalty. The referenced cases in that sec.
tion are not factually similar to the present case. One I
reference case, Ford v. Washington National Buildmg \
and Loan Association 10 Idaho 30, 76 P. 1010, was a
loan over a ten year period. The beginning rate of interest amounted to 12.563 and at the end of seven years
would exceed 363, with 183 per annum being the
maximum allowed by law. The defendant argued that
since the plaintiff could have paid the note prior to the
expiration date, then there would not have been usurious interest, and therefore, the usury statute should
not apply. The court however rejected this argument
stating as follows:
"It cannot be presumed that the contract was
executed with any view to payment in any other
manner or at any different time than that stipu·
lated therein. The contract shows on its face the
intent of the parties thereto. The intent was to
charge and collect, under devious and specious
pretexts, what amounted to a higher rate of in·
terest than that allowed by law.

"To allow the purposes and objects of the
usury statutes to be thwarted and the law evaded
by a corporate plan so unique would be an ac·
knowledgment of the inability of the courts to
look through a veneer of words and find the real
object and purpose soue-ht. It seems to me that
the doctrine of estoppel which prevents a party
from coming into court and seeking to have t~e
court· place a different construction upon h:s
contract from that which he has placed upon it
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by his continuous actions and conduct, and there-·
by prejudice the rights of the other contracting

party, should not be applied to prevent the enforcement of the usury statute.
·

The $54,000.00 received by plaintiff was in fact
as an additional sum for making the loan. There
1s no dispute that they received said sum, that there
11as no credit ever given by way of reduction of princi- ·
pay, credit to interest, or otherwise, and defendarit
· ihould be allowed to go to trial to show that said transiction was a guise to evade the usury laws.
take11

The agreement between plaintiff and defendant as
to the retention by plaintiff of the $45,000.00 has never
1
been made a part of the record. As stated previously
m tl11s brief on summary judgment, defendant should
have every opportunity, if there remains any question
whatsoever, to proceed with evidence at a trial and inthis regard there are ample facts present so that defendant should be allowed to submit said questions and
facts to a court or jury for disposition as to the question
of usury.
·

1

If the decision were to the contrary, either as to
sale of credit, the insertion of a period of time, or the
use of ::m intermediary, it would substantially modify
the effectiveness of the usury statute since any lender

could neatly utilize the loophole provided.

It should_ be _noted, that in the Bayou case, the
amount for which plaintiff received judgment was the
face amount of the note and any additional interest
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charges were excluded since they were usurious. If tht 11
interest was similarly found to be usurious here, then 1 il
plaintiff should only be entitled to $450,000.00 rather
than $516,376.95 as provided in the summary judgment
in their favor.
! ti

1

'u
So that the amounts of the judgment may correct!) u

be determined, the case should be remanded to the t(
District Court for the extension of the redemptio11
rights of the defendant six months after the final deter·
a1
mination of this litigation when the amount owed by the
m
defendant is finally determined.
The plaintiff has been in physical control of thr
premises since approximately October 1, 1966, and has
continued to operate the Club since that time without
interference from the defendants ( R. p. 39) . Althougl1
they have had the beneficial use of the Club smce that
time, they have nevertheless continued to charge defend·
ant interest on entire loan (R. 33, p. 5). There is an
agreement for the sale of the Country Club and acre·
age, (R. p. 39) and the extension of the redemption
period would appear to have little, if any, effect on the
plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should
only be granted with reluctance and when there are
no issues of fact. This is not true in the case before this .
court as the basic calculations using the amount of the
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loan received by the borrower would show that the
interest exceeded that allowed by the usury statute.

Furthermore, there are adequate facts to indicate
' that lhe use of an intermediary and agreements were
uml only as a basic subterfuge to attempt to avoid the
: usury laws of the State of Utah. In allowing such subtcrfuge this would nullify said usury laws.
j

!

Furthermore, there are sufficient questions of fact
and law to remand to the district COtJrt for trial to determine the question of usury.
Respectfully submitted,

NOLAN J. OLSEN
and
CARL T. SMITH
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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